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Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in UK listed SMEs: The effects of 
corporate board characteristics 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper examines the extent to which corporate board characteristics influence 
the level of dividend pay-out ratio using a sample of UK small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) from 2010 to 2013 listed on the Alternative Investment Market.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: The data is analysed by employing multivariate regression 
techniques, including estimating fixed effects, lagged effects and two-stage least squares 
regressions.  
 
Findings: The results show that board size, the frequency of board meetings, board gender 
diversity and audit committee size have a significant relationship with the level of dividend 
pay-out. Audit committee size and board size have a positive association with the level of 
dividend pay-out, whilst the frequency of board meetings and board gender diversity has a 
significant negative relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. By contrast, the findings 
suggest that board independence and CEO role duality do not have any significant effect on 
the level of dividend pay-out.  
 
Originality/value: This is one of the first attempts at examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and dividend policy in the UK’s Alternative Investment Market, with the 
analysis distinctively informed by agency theoretical insights drawn from the outcome and 
substitution hypotheses. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; corporate board characteristics; dividend pay-out 
policy; UK listed SMEs; outcome versus substitution hypothesis 
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1. Introduction 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have played, and are increasingly playing, an 
important role in most economies around the world, including in the UK. For example, in the 
UK, SMEs contribute up to 60 percent of total private sector employment. They account for 
about 99 percent of all private sector businesses and 47 percent of total private sector turnover 
(White, 2016), with a small number of them listed on the London Stock Exchange’s Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM). Thus, failure of SMEs can lead to significant reputational damage 
to the sector, as well as the UK economy (Herbane, 2013). In spite of the importance of SMEs 
to UK and worldwide economy, there seems to be a lack of empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of board mechanisms on dividend pay-out policies of SMEs (Belghitar & Khan, 2013).  
Meanwhile the continuous public interest and discussions surrounding board mechanisms 
supports the idea that corporate board features may affect dividend pay-out (Hu & Kumar, 
2004; Ozkan & Mancinelli, 2006; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; How et al., 2008; Al-Najjar & 
Hussainey, 2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Karim, Zijl & Mollah, 2013; Mansourinia et al., 2013; 
Ghasemi et al., 2013; Hao, Hu, Liu & Yao, 2014; Ntim et al., 2015a, b; Khan, Mihret & 
Muttakin, 2016; Ntim et al., 2017). Specifically, and given the diversity of, and fast-paced 
changes in, corporate dividend policies in the post-2007/08 period, it has become important to 
understand the central drivers of corporate dividend policy in the UK. Therefore, in this paper, 
we seek to contribute to the extant literature by investigating the association between corporate 
governance and dividend policy of UK listed SMEs in the post-2007/08 global financial crisis 
era. Specially, we examine the extent to which corporate board characteristics influence 
dividend pay-out ratio using a sample of UK listed SMEs from 2010 to 2013. 
Agency inspired theoretical literature has suggested several monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
good governance practices and dividends) that can be used to mitigate potential conflict of 
interest problems, including reducing the amount of free cash flow available to managers 
(DeAngelo et al., 2006; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Meanwhile, prior studies which 
examined the association between corporate governance quality and dividend pay-out policy 
have used two agency theoretical perspectives: the outcome and substitution hypotheses (Al-
Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2011; La-Porta et al., 2000; Sawick, 2009). Briefly, 
the outcome hypothesis suggests that the payment of dividends is a result of corporate 
governance regime, where managers in well-governed firms are less likely to retain cash within 
the firms in the absence of positive net present value (NPV) investments, and hence managers 
in well-governed firms tend to pay large dividends in order to signal shareholders their 
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commitment to treat them fairly by improving the returns on their investments (DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1990; La-Porta et al., 2000; Sawick, 2009). By contrast, the substitution hypothesis 
assumes that dividends are a substitute for corporate governance quality, where poorly-
governed firms are expected to pay larger dividends in order to maintain a good relationship 
with shareholders (John & Knyazeva, 2006; La-Porta et al., 2000). 
Due to the numerous reasons explaining why managers pay dividends to their shareholders, 
a plethora of studies have investigated the determinants of dividend policy (Litai et al., 2011; 
Gill & Obradovich, 2012; Mansourinia et al., 2013; Ghasemi et al., 2013), albeit with a number 
of observable limitations. First, the findings of existing studies relating to the determinants of 
dividend policy are largely mixed (Osobov & Denis, 2008; Banga & Gupta, 2010; Nnadi et al., 
2013; Maldajian & El Khoury, 2014; Brunzell et al., 2014). Second, existing studies have 
investigated largely how general firm level characteristics, such as cash flow (Travlos et al., 
2001; Fama & French, 2001), firm size (Al-Malkawi, 2007; Al-Kuwari, 2009, 2010; Jiraporn 
et al., 2011), leverage (Al-Shubiri, 2011; Afza & Mirza, 2011; Rafique, 2012; Emamalizadeh 
et al., 2013) and return on assets (Amidu, 2007; Gill et al., 2010; Adil et al., 2011; Ouma, 2012) 
affect dividend pay-out. By contrast and despite suggestions that dividend policy is determined 
by corporate boards and top executives (Borokhovich et al., 2005; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; 
How et al., 2008; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Borokhovich et al., 2013; Ghasemi et al., 
2013), existing studies examining the effect of corporate governance on dividend pay-out are 
rare (How et al., 2008; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; Zhang, 2008; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; 
Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Litai et al., 2011). Third, the limited prior studies 
examining the impact of corporate governance on dividend pay-out have also focused almost 
exclusively on large listed public corporations to the neglect of SMEs (Sharma, 2011; 
Subramaniam & Devi, 2011; Al-Swidi et al., 2012; Al-Taleb et al., 2012; Gill & Obradovich, 
2012; Thanatawee, 2012; Abor & Fiador, 2013; Arshad et al., 2013). Finally, despite increasing 
evidence that poor corporate governance practices played a role in instigating the 2007/08 
global financial crisis (Al-Bassam et al., 2015), there have been limited empirical studies, and 
inadequate critical reflections on the role of good governance on a number of organisational 
outcomes, such as dividend policy following the crisis. Together, these limitations considerably 
restrict current understanding of how and why SMEs pay dividends and crucially, what role 
corporate governance plays in such corporate decisions. 
Given this background, this study seeks to address some of the weaknesses of existing 
studies in a number of ways, and thereby extend, as well as make a number of new contributions 
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to the extant literature. First, we seek to contribute to the extant literature by examining the 
effect of board characteristics on dividend policy within the context of listed SMEs. This 
departs from most past studies that have investigated how general firms’ characteristics, such 
as cash flow, firm size, gearing and profitability impact on dividend policy in large publicly 
listed corporations. Second, given the variety of reasons explaining why corporations may 
develop dividend policy, and consistent with the existing literature (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 
2009; Jiraporn et al., 2011; La-Porta et al., 2000; Sawick, 2009), we inform our analysis with 
insights drawn from the outcome and substitution hypotheses. Third, we offer new timely 
empirical evidence on the effect of corporate board characteristics on dividend policy following 
the 2007/08 global financial crisis, which have been partly attributed widely to poor corporate 
governance practices.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will outline corporate 
governance developments and dividend policy within the UK corporate context. Section 3 will 
briefly elaborate on the theories underlying the study. Section 4 will review the literature and 
develop hypotheses. Section 5 will present the research design. Section 6 will present the 
empirical results, whilst section 7 will conclude the study. 
2. Corporate governance and dividend policy in the context of UK  
 
 Since the 1980s, the UK has been at the forefront of pursuing global reforms relating to 
the way companies are governed (Ntim, 2015). Observably, these corporate governance 
reforms followed failures of a number of large UK corporations, such as Barings Bank and 
Bank for Credit and Commerce International in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which poor 
corporate governance practices were largely implicated (Ntim et al., 2015a, b). To prevent 
future corporate failures arising from poor corporate governance practices, the Cadbury 
Committee was formed in 1991, and consequently the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
(Ntim & Osei, 2011). The Cadbury Report made a number of recommendations aimed at 
improving corporate governance practices by encouraging greater accountability, 
responsibility and transparency among corporate boards and executives (Ntim, 2015). For 
example, Cadbury Report recommended that every board should: (i) have at least 3 
independent directors; (ii) separate the roles of CEO and chairperson; (iii) establish an audit 
committee; and (iv) set up an internal audit and control system (Ntim, 2012a, b).  
A major limitation of the Cadbury Report was that it focused mainly on the financial aspects 
of corporate governance without considering other equally important issues, such as executive 
remuneration and risk management practices (Ntim et al. 2015a, b). Consequently, a number 
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of additional reports addressing different aspects of corporate governance were introduced. For 
example, the Greenbury Report was published in 1995. The Report sought to improve practices 
relating to executive remuneration by ensuring a stronger link between executive pay and 
corporate performance. In 1998, the Hampel Report, which consolidated the good corporate 
governance recommendations contained in the 1992 Cadbury Report and 1995 Greenbury 
Report to form the first ‘UK Combined Code’, was launched. In 1999, the Turnbull Report, 
which focused on making recommendations relating to good risk management practices, was 
implemented. In 2003, two different reports aimed at improving corporate governance practices 
were further published: Higgs and Smith Reports. The Higgs Report concentrated on improving 
board independence by defining and strengthening the involvement and role of independent 
directors, whilst the Smith Report sought to strengthen board effectiveness by encouraging the 
establishment of board sub-committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees. The good corporate governance recommendations contained in all these reports 
were further consolidated to form the second ‘UK Combined Code’ in 2003. Discernibly, the 
2003 Code emphasised the need for more board independence (majority of independent 
directors), board diversity (on the basis of gender, ethnicity, experience, age, and qualifications, 
amongst others) and regular board meetings (i.e., at least meet four times in a year), amongst 
other, good corporate governance practices (Ntim, 2015). The ‘2003 Combined Code’ has been 
revised almost every two years, including in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Additionally, 
and in order to enhance shareholder activism following the global financial crisis of 2007/08, 
the Stewardship Code was issued in 2010 and updated in 2012. This code emphasises that 
shareholders should play an active role in enhancing corporate governance structures in order 
to protect their wealth.   
Although the governance reforms pursued in the UK focused on improving corporate board 
decisions, including those relating to dividend policy, they did not specify exactly what 
corporate boards should do when it comes to dividend policy. Similarly, and unlike in other 
countries, where the payment of dividends is sometimes compulsory for all profit-making 
firms, according to the 2006 UK Companies Act, the payment of dividends by a corporation is 
voluntary. Specifically, Section 830 of the Act states two conditions under which dividend may 
be paid to shareholders as follows:   (i) “A company may only make a distribution out of profits 
available for the purpose of paying dividends”; and (ii) “A company's profits available for 
distribution are its accumulated, realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by 
distribution or capitalisation, less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously 
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written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital duly made”. However, and 
notwithstanding the voluntary nature of dividend policy in the UK, corporations face a critical 
dilemma when developing their policies relating to the payment of dividends to their 
shareholders. On the one hand, paying excessive amounts of corporate profits back to 
shareholders can stifle future growth potential by increasing cost of financing future 
investments via borrowing. On the other hand, leaving too much cash flow (‘excess cash flow 
problem’) in the hands of company executives can potentially increase agency problems. We, 
thus, argue that firms with good corporate governance credentials will be better placed to strike 
a fair balance between the amount of profits that are distributed to shareholders as dividends 
and those that are retained in the firm for investment than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
The central objective of this paper, therefore, is to examine the effect of corporate governance 
on dividend policy within UK listed SMEs. 
3. Theory 
There are two main theoretical perspectives that have been used by previous studies to 
explain the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and dividends pay-outs: 
the outcome and substitution hypotheses (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1990; Jiraporn et al., 2011; La-Porta et al., 2000; Sawick, 2009). The outcome 
hypothesis assumes that the payment of dividends is a result of the corporate governance 
regime (La-Porta et al., 2000), where managers in poor-governed firms are often interested in 
maximising their own personal wealth, by paying no or low dividends to shareholders (Al-
Taleb, 2012; La-Porta et al., 2000; Chen & Steiner, 1999). The availability of ‘free excess cash 
flow’ will permit such managers to invest and expand the size of the company (e.g., through 
empire building mergers and acquisitions) even in the absence of positive net present value 
(NPV) projects (Jensen, 1986, 1993; Shapiro, 2005). In contrast, managers in well-governed 
firms are expected to act according to the best interest of shareholders, by pursuing wealth 
maximising policies, such as paying larger dividends (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990). 
Therefore, and according to the outcome hypothesis, it is expected that corporate governance 
quality will be positively associated with dividend pay-out policy. 
On the other hand, the substitution hypothesis suggests that firms with poor governance 
structures tend to pay larger dividends in order to establish a positive reputation with 
shareholders (La-Porta et al., 2000). According to this hypothesis, dividends pay-out is a 
substitute for corporate governance quality, where managers in poor-governed firms are 
encouraged to pay larger dividends in order to establish good reputation with shareholders. By 
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establishing a positive reputation with shareholders, firms with poor governance structures will 
be able to attract future external funds at low costs than it will normally cost such firms to 
attract external funds (La-Porta et al., 2000). Based on this view, dividends pay-out can be used 
by poorly-governed firms as alternative governance mechanism to mitigate potential conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders (Sawicki, 2009). Thus, according to the 
substitution hypothesis, it is expected that firms with poor corporate governance structures have 
a greater need to establish a positive reputation by paying large dividends. Therefore and in 
contrast to the predictions of the outcome hypothesis, the substitution hypothesis expects that 
corporate governance quality will be negatively associated with dividend pay-out policy.  
4. Empirical literature review and hypotheses development 
As previous noted, a number of past studies have examined the effect of firm-level 
characteristics, such as size, cash flow, leverage and profitability on dividend policy (Valipour, 
Rostami & Salehi 2009; Okpara 2010; Hunjra 2011; Jagannathan & Marakani, 2011; 
Oladipupo & Ibadin 2013; Mirbagherijam 2014). By contrast, studies examining the extent to 
which corporate governance mechanisms affect dividend policy are generally scarce, but 
particularly acute in the case of SMEs (Thanatawee, 2012; Abor & Fiador, 2013; Arshad et al., 
2013; Ghasemi et al. 2013; Iqbal 2013; Mansourinia et al. 2013). Therefore, in this section, we 
seek to contribute to the extant literature by examining how corporate board characteristics 
(i.e., board size, board independence, CEO role duality, frequency of board meetings, board 
gender diversity and audit committee size) can affect dividend policy of SMEs. In addition, 
and following previous studies, we also investigate (control for) how general firm 
characteristics (including firm size, leverage, cash flow per share and return on assets) affect 
dividend payment.  
4.1 Board size and dividend policy 
Following the 2012 UK Combined Code, the number of board members should be 
sufficient such that the business of the corporation can be carried out without any significant 
challenges. According to the outcome hypothesis, larger boards are more effective in 
monitoring and controlling the opportunistic behaviours of management (i.e., exploiting free 
cash flows for themselves), since larger boards are associated with more expertise and 
experience, which can minimise agency problems and increase firm performance, including 
dividend pay-out (Ntim, 2011; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). By contrast, and based on the substitution 
hypothesis, larger boards are less effective in monitoring managerial opportunism, since they 
are often associated with more communication and co-ordination problems, and thereby poor 
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governance structures (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Jensen, 1993). As poor governance is often 
associated with larger boards, firms with larger boards are expected to pay higher dividends on 
average in order to compensate for their poor governance structures, such as poor managerial 
monitoring. 
Empirically, studies examining the connection between board size and dividend pay-out 
policy are rare, and therefore offering good opportunity to contribute to the literature. The 
findings of past studies relating to the link between board size and dividend pay-out policy are, 
however, observably mixed (e.g., Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Ozkan & Mancinelli, 2006; Litai et 
al., 2011; Ghasemi et al., 2013; Mansourinia et al., 2013). For example, Ozkan and Mancinelli 
(2006) reported a different result which suggested that firms with larger boards tend to be 
associated with greater managerial monitoring, and thus lower levels of agency problems. 
Similarly, the findings of Mansourinia et al. (2013) suggested a positive relationship between 
board size and dividend pay-out policy. In addition, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) reported a 
positive impact of board size on dividend pay-out among a sample of Australian companies. 
Further and using data from 1,056 A-share listed businesses in Shanghai and Shenzen stock 
exchange over a period of 7 years (2001-2008), Litai et al (2011) found that the size of a board 
is positively related to dividend pay-out policy.  
By contrast, other studies have reported a negative effect of board size on dividend pay-out 
policy. For example, the findings of Ghasemi et al. (2013) suggested a negative and significant 
relationship between board size and dividend pay-out policy among 81 Iranian listed 
enterprises on the Teheran Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2011. This notwithstanding and given 
the overwhelming evidence of a positive effect of board size on dividend pay-out policy, our 
first hypothesis is that:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and dividend pay-out rate. 
 
4.2 Board independence and dividend policy  
The outcome hypothesis suggests that the presence of outside directors has an important 
influence on board effectiveness, since they have more power to protect shareholder wealth in 
the form of dividend pay-out (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Hu & Kumar 2004; Ntim, 2011). 
Additionally, outside directors are suggested to have strong incentive to monitor and control 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour in order to enhance their reputation and image in the labour 
market (Borokhovich et al., 2005). By contrast, and based on the substitute hypothesis, 
dividends help in mitigating agency conflicts, particularly in firms with poor governance 
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practices, since dividends pay-out reduces the free cash flow available to managers 
(Easterbrook, 1984). 
The empirical evidence of the impact of outside directors on dividend pay-out policy is 
rare, and thus this study provides an opportunity to make a new contribution to the extant 
literature. For example, consistent with past studies (Borokhovich et al., 2005; Iqbal, 2013; 
Mansourinia et al., 2013; La-Porta et al., 2000), Abor and Fiador (2013) find a negative 
relationship between the presence of outside directors and dividend pay-out policy for a sample 
of 177 Nigerian firms. Within the UK corporate context, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) report 
empirical evidence of a statistically negative association between the number of outside 
directors and dividend pay-out among 400 non-financial firms. From a regulatory perspective, 
the various UK corporate governance Codes (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; and Combined Code, 
2010) recommend that the majority of boards’ members should be outside directors. This 
suggests that increasing the proportion of outside directors is considered as an important 
corporate governance mechanism, which reduce the need to pay larger dividends. Thus, our 
second hypothesis to be tested is that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between board independence and dividend pay-
out rate. 
 
4.3 CEO role duality and dividend policy 
Combining CEO and chairperson roles creates agency problems by concentrating too much 
executive power in the hands of CEOs and thus, allowing them to pursue their own interests at 
the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1993; Karim, Zijl & Mollah, 2013). Combining CEO and 
chair roles into one individual can also impact negatively on board independence by reducing 
monitoring over top management activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Karim, Zijl & Mollah, 
2013). Weak monitoring by corporate boards may grant opportunistic CEOs avenues to 
expropriate shareholder wealth by, for example, paying no or low dividends to shareholders 
(Dalton, 2014). By contrast, and based on the view of the substitute hypothesis, firms with 
combined leadership structure are expected to pay larger dividends in order to substitute for 
poor governance quality often associated with CEO role duality (Chen et al., 2016). 
Prior evidence on the link between CEO duality and divdend pay-out rates is generally 
mixed (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Hu & Kumar, 2004; Mansourinia et al., 2013; Litai et al., 2011; 
Zhang, 2008; Subramaniam & Devi, 2011). For example, and consistent with the results of 
previous studies (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; Litai et al., 2011; Sharma, 
2011), Zhang (2008) report a negative association between CEO duality and dividend pay-out 
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policy using a sample of Chinese firms. By contrast, Hu and Kumar (2004), Mansourinia et al. 
(2013) and Subramaniam and Devi (2011) find no association between CEO duality and 
dividend pay-out policy among US, Iranian and Malaysian listed firms, respectively. From UK 
regulatory perspective, much of the UK corporate governance reforms (i.e., from 1992 Cadbury 
Report to 2012 Combined Code) suggest that the roles of CEO and chairperson should be 
separated in order to enhance board independence, and thus, our third hypothesis to be tested 
is that: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and dividend pay-out rate. 
4.4 Frequency of board meetings and dividend policy 
Theoretically, there are inconclusive perspectives as to the impact of the frequency of board 
meetings on dividend pay-out policy. On the one hand, frequent board meetings can help in 
reducing agency conflicts by conveying information to managers and shareholders in a 
transparent way, and therefore bolstering the quality of work process (Greco 2011). 
Additionally, it has been suggested that frequent board meetings can improve board 
independence and effectiveness by allowing directors more time to monitor/evaluate 
management performance (Conger et al., 1998). Increased managerial monitoring associatd 
with board meetings can reduce agency problems and increase firm performance, including 
dividend pay-out (Ntim & Osei, 2011; Ntim, 2013a, b). On the other hand, the substitute 
hypothesis suggests that frequent board meetings may not be considered as a good governance 
mechanism, because it can reduce the time outside executives spend effectively in monitoring 
management (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992), and this may result in increasing agency costs (Vafeas, 
1999). To substitute for poor governance associated with frequent board meetings, managers 
may use dividends to signal to the market that shareholders’ interests are protected (Sawicki, 
2009). 
Empirically, although a number of past studies suggest that board meetings impacts 
significantly on performance (Chen & Chen, 2012; Hao, Hu, Liu and Yao, 2014; Hu et al., 
2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Ntim & Osei, 2011), there seems to be a lack of studies 
examining the effect of board meetings on dividend pay-out policy. This offers opportunity to 
make original contribution to the literature. Therefore, and to the extent that the frequency of 
board meetings impacts negatively on firm performance (Taghizadeh & Saremi, 2013), we 
expect that firms with frequent board meetings will be associated with good governance 
practices and dividends play a substitute role in mitigating agency problems when governance 
practices are poor and, hence, our fourth hypothesis to be tested is that:  
12 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of board meetings and 
dividend pay-out rate. 
                     
4.5 Board gender diversity and dividend policy 
Although, board diversity can be defined based on different attributes (e.g., education 
background, age, ethnicity and gender), this study focuses only on gender diversity aspect of 
the board for two reasons: (i) gender diversity aspect has been widely investigated (Chapple & 
Humphrey, 2014; Nguyen & Faff 2007; Julizaerma & Sori 2012; Ntim, 2015); and (ii) this 
aspect can be measured easily (Ntim, 2015). The outcome hypothesis suggests that board 
diversity can improve board independence and effectiveness by bringing diverse ideas, 
perspectives and experience to the board (Asher et al., 2005; Carter et al., 2003; Tsuji, 2012). 
Therefore, board gender diversity can increase firm performance and dividend pay-out. By 
contrast, and in line with the predictions of the substitute hypothesis, board gender diversity 
may not be considered as effective governance mechanism because it can increase conflict 
among board members (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009). As poor governance can be associated 
with gender-diverse boards, firms with more women on their boards are expected to pay larger 
dividends in order to substitute for weaker governance. 
Empirically, and although several past studies suggest that board gender diversity impacts 
positively on performance (Carter et al., 2003; Julizaerma & Sori, 2012; Ntim, 2015; Smith et 
al., 2006; Taghizadeh & Saremi, 2013), there seems to be a lack of studies examining the 
influence of board gender diversity on dividend pay-out policy. Thus, this study offers a timely 
contribution to the extant literature. For example, Carter et al. (2003) and Erhardt et al. (2003) 
report empirical evidence of a statistically positive association between board gender diversity 
and the performance of US firms. Within the UK context, the various corporate governance 
Codes (e.g., 2010 and 2012 Combined Codes) recommend that corporate boards should be 
sufficiently diverse in many aspects (e.g., gender, age, skills, and qualifications) in order to 
improve board effectiveness. Hence, this study hypothesises that firms with gender-diverse 
boards are associated with good governance practices and dividends play a substitute role in 
mitigating agency problems when governance practices are poor. Therefore, our fifth 
hypothesis to be tested is that: 
H5: There is a negative relationship between board gender diversity and dividend pay-
out rate. 
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4.6 Audit committee size and dividend policy 
Firms are required to establish independent audit committees in order to monitor and 
improve the quality of financial reporting that management provide to shareholders (Rezaee 
2009). According to the outcome hypothesis (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe 2006; Kajol & 
Sunday 2008), larger audit committees are suggested to be more effective in monitoring and 
controlling managerial opportunistic behaviours (paying no or low dividends to shareholders), 
because they are associated with more skills, experience and expertise. By contrast, the 
substitute hypothesis assumes that dividends can play a significant role in mitigating agency 
problems in firms with poor governance practices (Donaldson, 1991; Fox & Hamilton, 1994; 
Davis et al., 1997).  
There seems to be a lack of empirical evidence relating to the effect of audit committee size 
on dividend pay-out policy and therefore, a fertile area for further research. A number of past 
studies (Al-Swidi et al., 2012; Kajol & Sunday, 2008; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008) report 
empirical evidence that audit committee size impacts positively on firm performance. 
Therefore, and to the extent that firms with larger audit committees generate higher 
performance than firms with smaller audit committees, this study predicts that firms with large 
audit committees will pay high dividends to shareholders and, hence our final hypothesis to be 
tested is that:  
H6: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and dividend pay-out 
rate.  
 
5. Research Design 
5.1 Data considerations 
Our sample is drawn from all 1,096 Alternative Investment Market (AIM) listed firms on 
the London Stock Exchange as at May 2013. Firms included in our final sample need to meet 
three criteria: (i) availability of a firm’s annual report throughout the period from 2010-2013; 
(ii) availability of a firm’s corporate governance and financial data from 2010 to 2013; and (iii) 
availability of dividend pay-out data from 2010 to 2013. These criteria were used for several 
reasons. First, and consistent with past studies (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Litai et al., 2011; 
Mansourinia et al., 2013), these criteria allowed us to meet the conditions for balanced panel 
data analysis. Second, using both cross-sectional and time series of a 4-year data may allow us 
to detect whether the observed cross-sectional association between board characteristics and 
dividend pay-out policy holds over time. Third, due to the extensive nature of corporate 
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governance, financial and dividend pay-out data coupled with the labour intensive nature of 
manual collection, we limited our final sample to 50 firms from 2010 to 2013 (i.e., a total of 
200 firm year observations). Finally, the sample begins in 2010 in order to eliminate the impact 
of 2007/08 global financial crisis on corporate governance structures and dividend pay-out 
policies. The sample ends in 2013 because it is the most recent year for which data was 
available at the time data collection begun.  We collected board characteristics data from firms’ 
annual reports, which were downloaded from the Perfect Information database and company 
websites. We also collected data on accounting and financial variables from DataStream. 
5.2 Definition of variables and model specification 
All the main types of variables used in conducting our empirical analyses are summarised 
in Table 1. To test H1 to H6 (i.e., answer study’s central research question: the effect of board 
characteristics on dividend pay-out policy), we classify our variables into three main types. 
First, and following previous studies (Gill & Obradovich, 2012; Mansourinia et al., 2013; 
Arshad et al., 2013), dividend per share was used to represent the dividend behaviour by UK 
SMEs and it is defined as the aggregate declared dividends of a company paid out per year 
divided by the number of common shares issued. The current study used dividend per share 
because it is considered as a reliable measure of firms’ dividend payment policy 
(Charalambidis & Papadopoulos, 2007). Additionally, and consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Esqueda, 2016; Jiraporn et al., 2011; John & Knyazeva, 2006), this study employs the 
ratio of dividends to total assets as alternative proxy to check the robustness of our findings. 
Second, our main independent variables are board size (BS), board independence (BI), CEO 
duality (CEO), frequency of board meetings (BM), board gender diversity (BG) and audit 
committee size (AS). Finally, and in order to account for potential omitted variables bias 
(Gujarati 2003), we added four variables that may impact on dividend pay-out policy, including 
firm Size (FS), financial leverage (LEV), cash flow per share (CFS) and return on assets (ROA). 
For brevity purposes, we have not developed direct theoretical links between these control 
variables and dividend policy, but there is extensive evidence which suggest that these 
variables can influence dividend pay-out policy (Travlos et al., 2001; Fama & French 2001; 
Aivazian, Booth & Cleary 2003; Al-Malkawi 2007, 2008; Amidu 2007; Al-Kuwari 2009; Afza 
& Mirza 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Consler & Lepak 2011; Rafique 2012; Al-Taleb, Al-
Shubiri & Al-Zoued 2012; Ouma 2012; Eng, Yahya & Hadi 2013). Assuming that all the 
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hypothesised relationships are linear, our ordinary least square (OLS) regression model to be 
estimated is specified as follows:  
                                    

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65
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 AS + BD               
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
                              (1) 
Where: DP is the main dependent variable; BS, BI, CEO, BM, BD and AS are our main 
independent board characteristics variables; and CONTROLS refers to control variables 
including FS, LEV, CFS and ROA. 
6. Empirical results and discussion 
6.1 Summary descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation analyses 
Panels ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ of Table 2 presents the summary descriptive statistics of our main 
dependent, independent and control variables over the period investigated (2010-2013), 
respectively. Overall, the three panels show wide spread for all variables under examination. 
For example, and similar to the findings of prior studies (Esqueda, 2016; Jiraporn et al., 2011; 
John & Knyazeva, 2006), the ratio of dividends to total assets (DP2) ranges from 0.00 to 0.12 
with a mean of 0.021. Additionally, and consistent with the suggestions of Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993), the mean value of board size (BS) is 8.27 members, ranging from 4 
to 15 members. Board independence (BI) ranges from 20% to 80% with an average of 53%. 
The percentage of companies with a CEO who also chairs (CEO) the board is significant (mean 
of 0.92), indicating that, on average, there is a trend among AIM companies to combine the 
CEO and board chair into one. Frequency of board meetings (FM) ranges between a minimum 
of 4 meetings to a maximum of 16 annual meetings, with a mean of 8.70 annual board meetings 
and is in line with the similar findings of Ntim and Osei (2011), and Horváth and Spirollari 
(2012). Board gender diversity (BG) is, observably, low ranging between 0.00 and 0.40, with 
an average of 0.12, indicating that, on average, the boards of AIM companies are dominated 
by males. With respect to the other remaining variables, including DP, AS, FS, LEV, CFS and 
ROA, all show wide variation, indicating that there is adequate variation in our variables.  
 [Insert table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all variables included in our regression analysis 
in order to identify any potential multicollinearity problems. As a robustness check, we report 
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both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients. It is noticeable that 
magnitude and direction of both coefficients are generally similar; indicating that no serious 
non-normality problem exist. Additionally, both Pearson and Spearman coefficients indicate 
that the levels of correlation among all variables are somewhat low, suggesting that there are 
no serious multicollinearity problems among variables included in our study. 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Table 3 (focusing on Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients) shows statistically 
strong links among DP1/DP2, board characteristics and control variables. For example, and in 
line with our expectations, board size (BS) and audit committee size (AS) are positively 
associated with DP1/DP2. The evidence that firms with dual leadership pay low dividends is 
also consistent with our predictions. Evidence that firms with boards that meet more frequently 
(BM) pay significantly low dividends is in line with our expectations. However, evidence that 
board independence (BI) is positively associated with dividend pay-out policy is not consistent 
with our predictions. With reference to the control variables, the positive coefficients on firm 
size (FS), leverage (LEV), cash flow per share (CFS) and return on assets (ROA) are consistent 
with our predictions that these control variables have positive links with dividends pay-out 
policy. 
6.2 Multivariate regression analyses  
The empirical findings related to the effect of board characteristics on dividend pay-out 
rate (DP1) are reported in Models 1 to 6 of Table 4. Specifically, and in order to examine the 
effect of each independent variable on our results, we first regressed board size (BS) in addition 
to the control variables on DP1 (see Model 1 of Table 4). We then added board independence 
(BI), CEO role duality (CEO), board gender diversity (BG), frequency of board meetings (BM) 
and audit committee size (AS) to the regression models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively. Overall, 
and as shown in Model 6 of Table 4, the results indicate that board characteristics significantly 
impact DP1. First, and with reference to board size, the positive and significant association 
between BS and DP1 provides support for H1 (i.e., (There is a positive relationship between 
dividend payment policy and board size) and the findings of Gill and Obradovich (2012), 
Mansourinia et al. (2013) and Litai et al. (2011) who report a positive and statistically 
significant association between board size and dividend payment policy among US, Iranian 
and Chinese listed firms. Theoretically, the positive and significant finding is consistent with 
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the prediction that dividends are an outcome of good corporate governance (Jiraporn et al., 
2011; Sawicki, 2009). As explained earlier, larger boards enjoy several advantages, such as 
having more experienced and talented directors (Daniel & Coles 2008; Ntim, 2011; Ntim et 
al., 2015a, b). This can result in enhancing governance practices by increasing managerial 
monitoring and encouraging managers to follow wealth maximising policies, including paying 
shareholders larger dividends.  
 [Insert table 4 about here] 
Second, the negative coefficient on board independence (BI) in Table 4, suggests that H2 
(i.e., there is a negative link between board independence and dividend payment policy) is 
empirically supported. The evidence of a negative BI-DP1 nexus provide support for previous 
studies (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Borokhovich et al., 2005; Iqbal, 
2013; Mansourinia et al. 2013; La-Porta et al, 2000), which report a negative relationship 
between the presence of outside directors and dividend pay-out policy. Theoretically, the 
evidence is in line with the predictions of the substitute hypothesis that indicate that firms with 
good governance practices (higher proportion of independent outside directors) are less 
inclined to pay dividends (La-Porta et al., 2000), and this is because board independence and 
dividend pay-out are substitutes in mitigating agency costs (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009). 
Third, the results suggest that CEO role duality (CEO) is negatively associated with DP1, 
implying that H3 (i.e., there is a negative association between CEO role duality and dividend 
payment policy) is empirically supported. The negative coefficient on CEO also provide 
support to the findings of previous studies (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; 
Litai et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011; Zhang, 2008), which report a negative association between 
CEO duality and dividend pay-out policy. Theoretically, the negative finding offers support for 
the prediction of outcome hypothesis that poor governed firms (in the form of combining CEO 
and chairperson role) tend to pay lower dividends, and this is because dual leadership may 
allow opportunistic CEOs to make decisions and pursue strategies that may improve their 
personal wealth at the expense of shareholders (Dalton, 2014).  
Fourth, the frequency of board meetings (FM) in Table 4 is negatively and significantly 
associated with DP1. This implies that H4 (i.e., there is a negative relationship between 
frequency of board meeting and dividend payment policy) is supported. As explained above, 
there is a lack of studies investigating the impact of FM on dividend payment policy and most 
previous studies have focused on examining whether FM influences firm performance (Chen 
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& Chen, 2012; Hu et al., 2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Ntim & Osei, 2011). This offers 
opportunity to provide new evidence on FM’s impact on DP. Theoretically, the result offers 
support for the substitute hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000), which suggests that firms with poor 
governance tend to use dividends to maintain a positive reputation with shareholders. This 
implies that the payment of dividends can serve as substitute for the need for greater managerial 
monitoring through frequent board meetings.  
Fifth, board gender diversity (BG) is negatively and significantly associated with DP1, 
suggesting that H5 (i.e., there is a nagtive relationship between board gender diversity and 
dividend pay-out rate) is empirically supported. The evidence of a negative BG-DP1 nexus 
offers support for the findings of past studies (Smith et al., 2006; Nguyen & Faff, 2007; 
Julizaerma & Sori, 2012; Ntim, 2015), which suggest that gender-diverse boards provide better 
monitoring over managers and improve firm performance. Additionally, evidence of negative 
influence of BG in UK boardrooms is largely consistent with their extremely low representation 
(0.12, see Table 2). The negative finding also supports the suggestion of the substitute 
hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000) that firms need to establish a positive reputation with 
shareholders either by pursuing good governance practices or by paying more dividends in 
order to raise external funds in the future.  
Finally, audit committee size (AS) is statistically and positively associated with DP1, 
implying that H6 (i.e., there is a positive relationship between audit committee size and 
dividend pay-out rate) is supported. The positive finding supports the prediction that larger 
audit committees are associated with increased managerial monitoring (Al-damen et al., 2012; 
Al-Swidi et al., 2012). This may help in reducing agency problems (investments in negative 
NPV projects) by encouraging managers to distribute free excess cash flows to shareholders in 
the form of dividends in the absence of positive NPV projects. 
In addition to board characteristics, we control for a number of variables that have been 
identified by previous studies as factors affecting DP1 in order to reduce potential omitted 
variables bias. As hypothesised and consistent with previous studies (Baker, 2009; Consler & 
Lepak, 2011; Denninger, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Osman & Mohamed, 2010; Rafique, 2012; 
Thanatawee, 2013), we find statistically significant and positive association among firm size, 
leverage, cash flow per share and dividend pay-out rate. However, we find a positive, but 
insignificant, association between ROA and DP1, which is not in line with our expectations.  
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6.3 Additional analyses 
Four additional tests have been carried out in order to address some concerns associated 
with alternative dividend pay-out proxy and different endogeneity problems. These tests 
include the use of ratio of dividends to total assets as alternative proxy, two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), fixed-effects and lagged-effects models. First, to check the extent to which our main 
findings are robust to alternative dividend pay-out proxy, we use the ratio of dividends to total 
assets. This alternative dividend proxy has been employed in the current study because it is 
considered to be appropriate and also because it has widely been used in prior studies (e.g., 
Esqueda, 2016; Jiraporn et al., 2011; John & Knyazeva, 2006). Overall, after comparing the 
results reported in model 1 of Table 5 with the main OLS results, the findings remain relatively 
the same, and thereby indicating that the results of the current study are largely unaffected by 
potential problems that may be associated with the use of alternative dividend pay-out proxy.   
Second, to address the potential endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted variable 
bias, 2SLS model has been estimated. Following Beiner et al. (2006), a Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test (DWH) has been conducted to examine whether an endogenous relationship between the 
dividend pay-out and board mechanisms exists. To conduct Durbin-Wu test, we regressed our 
six board mechanisms on the four control variables and the resulting residuals from this 
regression are saved. We then regressed dividend pay-out ratio (DP1) on the saved residuals 
and the same control variables as shown in Model 2 of Table 5. The results indicate the 
existence of endogeneity problems, because the coefficients on the saved residuals are 
significant. This implies that 2SLS regression analysis may be more suitable compared to the 
OLS approach. Therefore, and in line with prior literature (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006), in the first 
stage, we conjectured that the board mechanisms will be influenced by the four control 
variables, and thus we regressed the board mechanisms on the four control variables and the 
predicted values of board mechanisms are saved. In the second stage, the predicted values of 
the board mechanisms are employed as instruments and used in re-estimating Model 6 of Table 
4. However, before replacing the actual values of board mechanisms with their predicted 
values, it is essential to ensure that the instruments (predicted values) are valid and appropriate 
to replace the actual values of board mechanisms. Following Beiner et al (2006), we used both 
Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices and we found that the predicted values of board 
mechanisms are highly correlated with their actual values. Additionally, the predicted values 
of the board mechanisms have no correlation with their residual values. This suggests that it is 
appropriate to use the predicted values of the board mechanisms as instruments to replace their 
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actual values (Beiner et al., 2006). Overall, the findings reported in Model 3 of Table 5 remain 
essentially the same as those contained in Model 6 of Table 4, and thus indicating that the 
findings appear to be robust to possible endogeneity issues that might arise from omitted 
variables bias. 
Third, to address potential endogeneity concerns that might emerge from simultaneous 
relationship between board characteristics and dividend pay-out rate, a lagged structure model 
has been estimated, whereby the current year dividend pay-out policy depends on the previous 
year’s board mechanisms. The results reported in Model 4 of Table 5 show some sensitivity. 
For example, board size and audit committee size, which were significantly positive in Model 
6 of Table 4, are now insignificant. Frequency of board meetings, which was significantly 
negative in Model 6 of Table 4, is now insignificant. However, the direction and the statistical 
significance level of the coefficients on board independence, CEO role duality and board 
gender diversity have not changed. Overall, Model 4 of Table 5 suggests that the findings are 
fairly robust to possible endogeneity issues that might emerge from simultaneous relationship 
among board characteristics and dividend pay-out policy. 
Finally, fixed-effect model has been estimated in order to address possible endogeneity 
problems that may arise from the presence of firm-level heterogeneities. This model has been 
estimated because it has been suggested that there may be other unobserved firm-specific 
factors (e.g., managerial talent and organisational culture), which can impact on DP1 that our 
OLS approach may be unable to determine (Ntim, 2012a, b, 2015). Therefore and to control 
for unobserved firm-level heterogeneities, Model 6 of Table 4 has been re-estimated by 
including 49 dummies to represent 50 sampled firms. The findings shown in Model 5 of Table 
5 remain generally the same, indicating that the findings of the study are fairly robust to the 
presence of any possible endogeneity problems that may emerge from the presence of firm-
specific heterogeneities. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy (DP) using a 
sample of UK small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) listed on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) from 2010 to 2013. Our study extends, as 
well as contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, despite the importance of 
good corporate governance practices and the considerable amount of corporate governance 
reforms which have been pursued around the world, previous studies have examined only the 
impact of general firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, cash flow, and gearing) on dividend 
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policy among large publicly listed firms to the neglect of SMEs. This arguably limits current 
understanding of why and how corporate governance practices may affect dividend pay-out 
policies of SMEs. Therefore, this study contributes to the extant literature by examining the 
link between board characteristics (board size, board independence, CEO role duality, 
frequency of board meetings, board gender diversity and audit committee size) on DP in a 
major European country. Overall, the results indicate that board characteristics have a 
significant impact on DP among publicly listed UK SMEs. Additionally, our findings support 
the view that dividends can act as substitute for corporate governance mechanisms (such as 
board characteristics) in poorly governed firms.  
Second, we offer a timely new empirical insights relating to board characteristics and 
dividend policy following the recent global financial crisis. Third, our findings have a number 
of implications for companies and shareholders, policymakers, regulatory authorities and other 
countries. The evidence implies that managers in poorly-governed SMEs may be compelled to 
pay larger dividends if they are to maintain a positive relationship with shareholders. In 
contrast, managers in better-governed SMEs may be able to raise funds in future at lower costs 
by building positive reputation with shareholders via the maintenance of good governance 
mechanisms. In doing so, well-governed SMEs may be able to pay relatively less dividends in 
order to retain profits for future expansion and growth without the need to raise funds from 
external sources at higher costs. Fourth, the evidence provided in this paper offers potential 
theoretical and empirical insight for future studies. In terms of theoretical expansions, the 
evidence suggests that future studies may improve their theoretical grounds by using other 
theories, such as stakeholder and resource dependence theories, when examining factors 
influencing dividend pay-out policy. With respect to the empirical expansions, this paper 
focuses only on listed SMEs in the UK; however, future studies can extend the current study 
by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend policy in different 
international governance environments (i.e., developed or developing countries).  
Finally, our study has a number of limitations, including restricting our analysis to only 
board characteristics in listed SMEs. Future studies may consider the impact of other corporate 
governance and ownership mechanisms on dividend pay-out policy in listed and non-listed 
SMEs. In addition, and as data becomes available in the future, future studies may consider 
other factors (e.g., capital structure, tax policy, macro-economic conditions, inflation rate, and 
political situation or corporate political connections (e.g. Khan, Mihret & Muttakin, 2016)) that 
can influence dividend policy in SMEs . Similarly, and due to labour intensive nature of 
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manually collecting the required data, we restricted our final sample to 50 firms over the period 
from 2010-2013 (i.e., resulting in a total of 200 firm-year observations). Thus, future studies 
can extend our study by increasing the sample size and covering longer period of time (i.e., 
before and after 2007/08 global financial crisis). Additionally, data used in this study is 
primarily collected from secondary archival databases, and thus future studies can improve our 
understanding by conducting in-depth face-to-face interviews and qualitative analysis of 
primary data to gain further insights relating to the drivers of dividend pay-out policy in SMEs. 
 
 
Note 
1. There were 1,096 Alternative Investment Market (AIM) listed firms on the London Stock Exchange as 
at May 2013. Approximately 430 of the firms met our sample selection criteria. However, due to the 
extensive nature of corporate governance, financial and dividend pay-out data coupled with the labour 
intensive nature of manual collection, we limited our final sample to 50 firms from 2010 to 2013 (i.e., a 
total of 200 firm year observations), consisting of the top 25 (largest) and bottom 25 (smallest) firms, 
ranked by market capitalisation. 
23 
 
Reference 
Abor, J., & Fiador, V. (2013). Does corporate governance explain dividend policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa? International Journal of Law and Management, 55(3), 201-225. 
Adil, C., Zafar, N., & Yaseen, N. (2011). Empirical analysis of determinants of dividend pay-out: 
Profitability and liquidity. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(1), 
289-300. 
Afza, T., & Mirza, H.H. (2011). Do mature companies pay more dividends? Evidence from Pakistani 
stock market. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2(2), 152-161. 
Aivazian, V., Booth, L., & Cleary, S. (2003). Do emerging market firms follow different dividend 
policies from U.S. firms? Journal of Financial Research, 26(3), 371-387. 
Al-Bassam, W.M., Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., & Downs, Y. (2015). Corporate boards and ownership 
structure as antecedents of corporate governance disclosure in Saudi Arabian publicly listed 
corporations. Business & Society, Forthcoming. 
Al-Kuwari, D. (2009). Determinants of the dividend policy in emerging stock exchanges: The case of 
GCC countries. Global Economy & Finance Journal, 2(2), 38-63. 
Al-Kuwari, D. (2010). To pay or not to pay: Using emerging panel data to identify factors influencing 
corporate dividend policy pay out decisions. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 42, 19-36. 
Al-Malkawi, H. (2007). Determinants of corporate dividend policy in Jordan: An application of the 
Tobit model. Journal of Economic & Administrative Sciences, 23(2), 44-70. 
Al-Malkawi, H. (2008). Factors influencing corporate dividend decision: Evidence from Jordanian 
panel data. International Journal of Business, 13(2), 176-195. 
Al-Matari, Y.A., Al-swidi, A. K., & Fadzil, F.H.M. (2012). Board of directors, audit committee 
characteristics and performance of Saudi Arabia listed companies. International Review of 
Management and Marketing, 24, 12-51. 
Al-Najjar, B., & Hussainey, K. (2009). The association between dividend pay-out and outside 
directorships. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 10(1), 4-19. 
Al-Shubiri, F.N. (2011). Determinants of changes dividend behavior policy: Evidence from the Amman 
stock exchange. Far East Journal of Psychology and Business, 4(2), 1-15.  
Al-Swidi, A.K., Fadzil, F.H., & Al-Matari, Y.A. (2012). The impact of board characteristics on firm 
performance: Evidence from nonfinancial listed companies in Kuwaiti stock exchange. International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(2), 310-332. 
Al-Taleb, G. (2012). Measurement of impact agency costs level of firms on dividend and leverage 
policy: An empirical study. Interdisciplinary journal of contemporary research in business, 3(10), 
234-243. 
Al-Taleb, G., Al-Shubiri, F.N., & Al-Zoued. (2012). The relationship between ownership structure and 
dividend policy: An empirical investigation. Review of International Comparative Management, 
13(4), 644- 657. 
Amidu, M. (2007). How does dividend policy affect performance of the firm on Ghana Stock 
Exchange? Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 4(2), 103-112. 
Arshad, Z., Akram, Y., Amjad, M., & Usman, M. (2013). Ownership structure and dividend policy. 
Institute of Interdisciplinary Business Research, 5(3), 378-401. 
Asher, C.C., Mahoney, J.M., & Mahoney, J.T. (2005). Towards a property rights foundation for a 
stakeholder theory of the firm. Journal of Management & Governance, 9(1), 5-32. 
Banga, C., & Gupta, A. (2010). The determinants of corporate dividend policy. Decision, 37(2), 63-77. 
Baranchuk, N., & Dybvig, P. H. (2009). Consensus in diverse corporate boards. Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(2), 715-747. 
Belghitar, Y., & Khan, J. (2013). Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash 
holdings. Small Business Economics, 40(1), 59-72. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M.M., & Zimmermann, H. (2006). An integrated framework of 
corporate governance and firm valuation. European Financial Management, 12(2), 249-283.  
Borokhovich, K.A., Brunarski, K.R., Harman, Y., & Kehr, J.B. (2005). Dividends, corporate monitors 
and agency costs. Financial Review, 40(1), 37-65. 
24 
 
Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 409-434. 
Brunzell, T., Liljeblom, E., Löflund, A., & Vaihekoski, M. (2014). Dividend policy in Nordic listed 
firms. Global Finance Journal, 25(2), 124-135. 
Cadbury. (1992). The Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance. London: Gee. 
Chapple, L., & Humphrey, J. E. (2014). Does board gender diversity have a financial impact? Evidence 
using stock portfolio performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 122(4), 709-723. 
Charalambidis, D.P., & Papadopoulos, D.L. (2007). Focus on present status and determinants of 
dividend pay-out policy: Athens stock exchange in perspective. Journal of Financial Management 
and Analysis, 20(2), 24-37. 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value. Financial review, 38(1), 33-53.  
Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Goergen, M. (2016). The Impact of Board Gender Composition on Dividend 
Pay-outs. Working Paper No. 488/2016. 
Chen, S.-S., & Chen, I.-J. (2012). Corporate governance and capital allocations of diversified firms. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(2), 395-409.  
Chen, C.R., & Steiner, T.L. (1999). Managerial ownership and agency conflicts: A nonlinear 
simultaneous equation analysis of managerial ownership, risk taking, debt policy, and dividend 
policy. Financial Review, 34(1), 119-136. 
Conger, J.A., Finegold, D., & Lawler, E.E. (1998). Appraising boardroom performance. Harvard 
Business Review, 76(1), 136-148. 
Consler, J., & Lepak, G.M. (2011). Earnings per share versus cash flow per share as predictor of 
dividends per share. Managerial Finance, 37(5), 482-488. 
Dalton, K. (2014). Book Review: Key Concepts in Organisation Theory. London: SAGE Publications. 
Daniel, N.D., & Coles, J.L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 
87(2), 329-356. 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. 
Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Stulz, R. M. (2006). Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital 
mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial economics, 81(2), 227-254. 
Denninger, K. (2012). Leverage. US: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Donaldson, L. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. 
Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49-64. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American Economic Review, 
74(4), 650-659. 
Emamalizadeh, M., Ahmadi, M., & Pouyamanesh, J. (2013). Impact of financial leverage on dividend 
policy at Tehran Stock Exchange: A case study of food industry. African Journal of Business 
Management, 7(34) 3287-3296. 
Eng, S.H., Yahya, M.H., & Hadi, A.R.A. (2013). The dividend pay-out policy – A comparison on 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional financial institutions. In The 2013 WEI International Academic 
Conference Proceedings Istanbul, Turkey. Retrieved from: http://www.westeastinstitute.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/. 
Ergungor, O.E. (2004). Dividends. Retrieved from: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-
637841331.html. 
Erhardt, N.L., Werbel, J.D., & Schrader, C.B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm financial 
performance. Corporate Governance, 11, 102-111. 
Esqueda, O. A. (2016). Signaling, corporate governance, and the equilibrium dividend policy. Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance, 59, 186-199. 
Fama, E.F., & French, K.R. (2001). Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or lower 
propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60(1), 3-43. 
Fama, E.F., and Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of law and 
     economics,26, 301-325. 
Fox, M.A., & Hamilton, R.T. (1994). Ownership and diversification: Agency theory or stewardship 
theory. Journal of Management Studies, 31(1), 69-81. 
25 
 
FRC. (2010). The UK Approach to Corporate Governance. London: Financial Reporting Council. 
FRC. (2012). The UK Corporate Governance Code. London: Financial Reporting Council. 
Ghasemi, R.S., Madrakian, H., & Keivani, F.S. (2013).  The Relationship between the corporate 
governance and the stock institutional ownership with the dividend - A case study of Tehran. Journal 
of Business and Management, 15(2), 65-69. 
Ghauri, P., & Gronhaug, K. (2002). Research Methods in Business Studies. Essex: Financial Times. 
Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C.F. (2006). Do managerial motives impact dividend decisions in REITs? 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 32(3), 327-355. 
Gill, A., & Obradovich, J. (2012). Corporate governance, institutional ownership, and the decision to 
pay the amount of dividends: Evidence from USA. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 97, 60-71. 
Greco, G. (2011). Determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency: Evidence from Italian 
companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 26(3), 208-229. 
Greenbury. (1995). Director's remuneration. GEE: London, UK. 
Gujarati, D.N. 2003. Basic econometrics. 4th Edition: New York: Mcorporate governanceraw-Hill. 
Hao, Q., Hu, N., Liu, L. and Yao, L.J. (2014) Board interlock networks and the use of relative 
performance evaluation. International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, 22 (3), 
237-251 
Harada, K. & Nguyen, P. (2011). Ownership concentration and dividend policy in Japan. Managerial 
Finance, 37(4), 362-379. 
Herbane, B. (2013). Exploring Crisis Management in UK Small‐and Medium‐Sized Enterprises. 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 21(2), 82-95. 
Holder, M.E., Langrehr, F.W., & Hexter, J.L. (1998). Dividend policy determinants: An investigation 
of the influences of stakeholder theory. Financial Management, 27(3), 73-82. 
Horne, J.C., & McDonald, J.G. (1971). Dividend policy and new equity financing. Journal of Finance, 
26(2), 507-519. 
Horváth, R., & Spirollari, P. (2012). Do the board of directors’ characteristics influence firm’s 
performance? The U.S. evidence. Prague Economic Papers, 4, 470- 486. 
How, J.C.Y., Verehoeven, P., & Wu, C.L. (2008). Dividends and expropriation in Hong Kong. Asian 
academy of management journal of accounting and finance, 4(1), 71-85. 
Hu, A., & Kumar, P. (2004). Managerial entrenchment and pay-out policy. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 39(4), 759-790. 
Hu, H. W., Tam, O. K., & Tan, M. G.-S. (2010). Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance 
in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4), 727-749.  
Hunjra, A. I. (2011). Patterns of capital structure and dividend policy in Pakistani corporate sector and 
their impact on organization performance. Africa journal of business management, 5(27), 77-85. 
Hussin, N., & Othman, R. (2012). Code of corporate governance and firm performance. British Journal 
of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 4(2), 1-22. 
Iqbal, S. (2013). The impact of corporate governance on dividend decision of firms: Evidence from 
Pakistan. African Journal of Business Management, 7(11), 811-817. 
Jagannathan, R. and Marakani, S. (2011). Long Run Risks & Price/Dividend Ratio Factors. Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-339. 
Jensen, M.C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. 
Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
Jermann, U., & Quadrini, V. (2012). Macroeconomic effects of financial shocks. American Economic 
Review, 102(1), 238-271. 
John, K., & Knyazeva, A. (2006). Pay-out policy, agency conflicts, and corporate governance. Working 
Paper, May 2006. 
Julizaerma, M.K., & Sori, Z. (2012). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance of 
Malaysian public listed companies. Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences, 65, 1077-1085. 
Juma’h, A.H., & Pacheco, C.J. (2008). The financial factors influencing cash dividend policy: A sample 
of US manufacturing companies. International Metro Business Journal, 4(2), 23-43. 
26 
 
Kajol, & Sunday. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance: The case of Nigerian listed firm. 
European Journal of Economics, 6(3), 1-13. 
Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and 
management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting research, 43(3), 453-
486.  
Karim, A.K.M.W., Zijl, T.V. and Mollah, S. (2013) Impact of board ownership, CEO-Chair duality and 
foreign equity participation on auditor quality choice of IPO companies: evidence from an emerging 
market. International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, 21 (2), 148-169 
Kester, G., & Robbin, G. (2011). Dividend policy. Accountancy Ireland, 43(2) 42-44.   
Khan, A., Mihret, D.G. and Muttakin, M.B. (2016) Corporate political connections, agency costs and 
audit quality. International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, 24 (4), 357-374. 
Kiel, G.C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the 
australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. 
Jiraporn, P., Kim, J. C., & Kim, Y. S. (2011). Dividend pay-outs and corporate governance quality: 
An empirical investigation. Financial Review, 46(2), 251-279. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance in Africa: A dynamic 
panel data analysis. Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 32(2), 1-24. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2006). The link between corporate governance and 
performance of the non-traditional export sector: Evidence from Ghana. Corporate Governance: 
The International Journal of Business in Society, 5(6), 609-623. 
La-Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (2000). Agency problems and dividend 
policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J.W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Business 
Lawyer, 48, 59-77. 
Litai, C., Chuan, L., & Kim, Y. (2011). Financial characteristics, corporate governance and the 
propensity to pay cash dividends of chinese listed companies. International Business and 
Management, 3(1), 176-188. 
Luo, Y. (2015). CEO power, ownership structure and pay performance in Chinese banking. Journal of 
Economics and Business, 82, 3-16. 
Maldajian, C. & El Khoury, R. (2014). Determinants of the dividend policy: An empirical study on the 
Lebanese listed banks. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(4), 240-256. 
Mansourinia, E., Emamgholipour, M., Rekabdarkolaei, E.A., & Hozoori, M. (2013). The effect of board 
size, board independence and CEO duality on dividend policy of companies: Evidence from Tehran 
stock exchange. International Journal of Economy, Management and Social Sciences, 2(6), 237-
241. 
Mirbagherijam, M. (2014). Asymmetric effect of inflation on dividend policy of Iran’s stocks market. 
International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 4(2), 21-32. 
Mitton, T. (2004). Corporate governance and dividend policy in emerging markets. Emerging Markets 
Review, 5(4), 409-426. 
Nguyen, H., & Faff, R. (2007). Impact of board size and board diversity on firm value: Australian 
evidence. Corporate ownership and control, 4(2), 24-32. 
Nnadi, M., Wogboroma, N., & Kabel, B. (2013). Determinants of dividend policy: Evidence from listed 
firms in the African stock exchanges. Panoeconomicus, 60(6), 725-741. 
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S., Osei, K.A., Thomas, D.A., Abdou, H., and Opong, K.K (2017). ‘Executive Pay 
and Performance: The Moderating Effect of CEO Power and Governance Structure’, International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, Forthcoming. 
Ntim, C.G. (2013a). Monitoring board committee structure and market valuation in large publicly listed 
South African corporations. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 5(3), 
310-325. 
Ntim, C.G. (2013b). Corporate governance, affirmative action and firm value in post-Apartheid South 
Africa: A simultaneous equation approach. African Development Review, 25(2), 148-172. 
Ntim, C.G. (2012a). Does the South African stock market values independent board dual leadership 
structure? Economics and Business Letters, 1(1), 35-45.  
27 
 
Ntim, C.G. (2012b). Director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa. African 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(4), 359-373. 
Ntim, C.G. (2015). Board diversity and organizational valuation: Unravelling the effects of ethnicity 
and gender. Journal of Management and Governance, 19(1), 167-195. 
Ntim, C.G., & Osei, K.A. (2011). The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance in 
South Africa. African Review of Economics and Finance, 2(2), 83-103. 
Ntim, C.G. (2011). The King Reports, independent non-executive directors and firm valuation on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Corporate Ownership and Control, 9(1), 428-440. 
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S., Osei, K.A., & Thomas, D.A. (2015b). Executive director pay, corporate 
governance and performance: A simultaneous equation approach. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 36(2), 67-96.  
Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., & Danbolt, J. (2015a). Board size, corporate regulations and firm valuation 
in an emerging market: A simultaneous equation approach. International Review of Applied 
Economics, 29(2), 194-220. 
Okpara, G. (2010). Asymmetric information and dividend policy in emerging markets: empirical 
evidence from Nigeria. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2(4), 32-43. 
Oladipupo, A., & Ibadin, P. (2013). Does working capital management matter in dividend policy 
decision? Empirical evidence from Nigeria. International Journal of Financial Research, 4(4), 140-
145. 
Olshansky, S.J., Perry, D., Miller, R.A., & Butler, R.N. (2007). Pursuing the longevity dividend. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1114(1), 11-13. 
Osobov, I., & Denis, D. J. (2008). Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the 
determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 62-82. 
Ouma, O.P. (2012). The relationship between dividend pay-out and firm performance: A study of listed 
companies in Kenya. European Scientific Journal, 8(9), 199-215. 
Ozkan, A., & Mancinelli, L. (2006). Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian 
firms. European Journal of Finance, 12(3), 265-282. 
Powell, G.E., & Baker, H.K. (1999). How corporate managers view dividend policy. Quarterly Journal 
of Business and Economics, 38(2), 17-35. 
Rafique, M. (2012). Factors affecting dividend pay-out: Evidence from listed non-financial firms of 
Karachi stock exchange. Business Management Dynamics, 1(11), 76-92.  
Reddemann, S., Basse, T., & Von Der Schulenburg, J.G. (2010). On the impact of the financial crisis 
on the dividend policy of the European insurance industry. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 
Issues and Practice, 35(1), 53-62. 
Rezaee, Z. (2009). Corporate Governance and Ethics. Hoboken: John Willey & Sons. 
Sekaran, U., & Bougie, R. (2010). Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Sawicki, J. (2009). Corporate governance and dividend policy in Southeast Asia pre-and post-crisis. 
European Journal of Finance, 15(2), 211-230. 
Shapiro, S. P. (2005). Agency theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31(1), 263-284. 
Sharma, V. (2011). Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 17(4), 1001-1015. 
Singhania, M., & Gupta, A. (2012). Determinants of corporate dividend policy: A Tobit model 
approach. Journal of Business Perspective, 16(3), 153-162. 
Subramaniam, R., & Devi, S.S. (2011). Corporate governance and dividend policy in Malaysia. In 
International Conference on Business Economics Research, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Retrieved 
from: http://www.ipedr.com/vol1/44-B10051.pdf. 
Taghizadeh, M., & Saremi, S. (2013). Board of directors and firms’ performance: Evidence from 
Malaysian public listed firm. International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research, 
59(37), 178–182. 
Thanatawee, Y. (2012). Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Thailand. 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 5(1), 121-132. 
Tong, S., Junarsin, E., & Davidson, W. (2013). A comparison of Chinese state-owned enterprise firm’s 
boards and private firm’s boards. In Proceedings of 23rd International Business Research 
28 
 
Conference 18 - 20 November, 2013 Melbourne, Australia. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wbiworldconpro.com/uploads/melbourne-conference-2013. 
Travlos, N., Trigeorgis, L., & Vafeas, N. (2001) Shareholders wealth effect on dividend policy changes 
in an emerging stock market: The case of Cyprus. Multinational Finance Journal, 5(2), 87-112. 
Tsuji, C. (2012). A discussion on the signalling hypothesis of dividend policy. Open Business Journal, 
5(1), 1-7. 
Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 
53(1), 113-142. 
Valipour, H., Rostami, V., & Salehi, M. (2009). Asymmetric information and dividend policy in 
emerging markets: Empirical evidences from Iran. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 
1(1), 203-211. 
White, S. (2016). Business population estimates for the UK and regions 2016. Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy. UK, Sheffield. 
Zhang, H. (2008). Corporate governance and dividend policy: A comparison of Chinese firms listed in 
Hong Kong and in the mainland. China Economic Review, 19(3), 437-459. 
  
29 
 
Table 1. 
Variables Definition and Measurement. 
Dividend pay-out rate 
  DP1 The aggregate declared dividends of a company paid out per year 
divided by the number of common shares issued. 
   DP2 Ratio of aggregate dividends declared to total assets 
Corporate governance 
  BS Total number of inside and outside directors on a company’s board in 
a financial year. 
  BI Number of independent outside directors divided by the total number 
of directors on a company’s board in a financial year. 
  CEO 1 if the roles CEO and chairperson are held by separate individuals, 0 
otherwise.  
  BM Total number of meetings held by a company’s board in a financial 
year. 
  BG Total number of female directors to the total number of directors on a 
company’s board in a financial year. 
  AS Total number of directors that serve on the audit committee. 
Control Variables 
  FS Natural log of total assets. 
  LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
  CFS Cash flow divided by total common share. 
  ROA Operating profits divided by total asset. 
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Table 2. 
Summary descriptive statistics  
      
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Dividend pay-out rate     
  DP1 0.31 0.15 0.38 0.004 1.96 
  DP2 0.021 0.01 0.024 0.00 0.12 
 Panel B: Corporate governance 
 BS 8.27 8.00 2.65 4.00 15.00 
 BI (%) 0.53 0.55 0.11 0.20 0.80 
 CEO 0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
  BM 8.70 9.00 2.29 4.00 16.00 
  BG (%) 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.40 
 AS 3.22 3.00 1.48 0.00 9.00 
Panel C: Control Variables    
 FS 14.41 14.29 2.16 9.78 19.34 
 LEV (%) 2.67 2.20 1.86 0.96 16.43 
 CFS (%) 0.006 -0.006 0.21 -0.94 1.24 
  ROA (%) 8.72 7.54 17.06 -190.33 39.12 
Notes: BS denotes board size; BI denotes board independence; CEO denotes CEO role 
duality; BM denotes frequency of board meetings; BG denotes board gender diversity; AS 
denotes audit committee size; FS denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; CFS denotes 
cash flow per share and ROA denotes return on assets. Table 1 fully defines all the variables 
used. 
31 
 
Table 3. 
Correlation Matrix. 
Variable DP1 DP2 BS BI CEO BM BG AS FS LEV CFS ROA 
  DP1 
 
.993*** .690*** .133* -.078 -.427*** .041 .491*** .569*** .136*  .036  .159**  
  DP2 0.989***  .657*** .126* -.084 -.424*** .044 .465*** .485*** .125* .042 .170** 
  BS .447*** .449*** 
 
.244*** -.039 -.283*** .085  .616*** .634*** .217*** .000 .034 
  BI .095 .088 .277***  -.016 -.053 .083 .302*** .136* .063 -.052 .035 
  CEO -.102 -.089 -.033 .021 
 
.089 .044 .065 -.059 -.054 -022 -.064 
  BM -.369*** -.371*** -.222*** -.088  .106 
 
.053 -.109 -.201*** .163** .055 -.036 
  BG -.037 -.025 .104 .092  .042 .050 
 
.175** .022 -.013 .077 .005 
  AS .398*** .381*** .610*** .401*** .080 -.055 .212*** 
 
.490*** .204*** .057 -.028 
  FS .433*** .355*** .602*** .195*** -.051  -.168** .039 .453*** 
 
.257*** -.034 -.037 
  LEV .172** .159** .067 .051 .002  .093 .021  .104 .105  .017 -.045 
  CFS .262*** .250*** -.007 -.052 .037  .014 .068  .083 .031 .139**  .075 
  ROA .169** .173** .074 -.067 -.032 -.100 .021 .067 .049  .104 .053  
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficient, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients. Variables are definite as follows: BS denotes board size; BI denotes board independence; CEO denotes CEO role duality; BM denotes frequency 
of board meetings; BG denotes board gender diversity; AS denotes audit committee size; FS denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; CFS denotes cash 
flow per share and ROA denotes return on assets. ***, ** and * indicate that correlations among variables are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
(2-tailed) respectively. 
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Table 4 
Effect of corporate governance on dividend pay-out policy 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
DP1 
(1) 
DP1 
(2) 
DP1 
(3) 
  DP1 
(4) 
DP1 
(5) 
DP1 
(6) 
VIF 
Corporate governance:          
BS 0.049(.000)*** 0.050(.000)*** 0.050(.000)***   0.043(.000)*** 0.044(.000)*** 0.031(.007)*** 2.115 
BI - -0.087(.668) -0.078(.702)   -0.118(.539) -0.098(.611) -0.266(.181) 1.226 
CEO - - -0.119(.142)   -0.083(.282) -0.080(.302) -0.103(.177) 1.030 
BG - - -   -0.045(.000)*** -0.044(.000)*** -0.047(.000)*** 1.109 
BM - - -   - -0.271(.157) -0.357(.062)* 1.058 
AS - - -   - - 0.052(.007)*** 1.932 
Controls:          
FS 0.036(.005)*** 0.036(.000)*** 0.035(.006)***   0.033(.008)*** 0.032(.009)*** 0.027(.023)** 1.623 
LEV 0.017(.165) 0.017(.161) 0.017(.158)   0.024(.038)** 0.024(.039)** 0.023(.043)** 1.059 
CFS 0.428(.000)*** 0.425(.000)*** 0.432(.000)***   0.430(.000)*** 0.440(.000)*** 0.412(.000)*** 1.044 
ROA 0.003(.055)* 0.002(.062)* 0.002(.068)*   0.002(.148) 0.002(.138) 0.002(.180) 1.042 
Constant -0.678*** -0.643*** -0.526***   -0.060 -0.054 0.106 - 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.061 2.061 2.059   2.109 2.111 2.050 - 
F- value 20.740*** 17.241*** 15.179***   17.668*** 16.012*** 15.657*** - 
Adj. R2 0.332 0.329 0.333   0.401 0.404 0.424 - 
No. of observations 200 200 200   200 200 200 - 
Notes: BS denotes board size; BI denotes board independence; CEO denotes CEO role duality; BM denotes frequency of board meetings; BG denotes board gender 
diversity; AS denotes audit committee size; FS denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; CFS denotes cash flow per share and ROA denotes return on assets. P-
values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. 
Robustness analysis of the effect of  corporate governance on dividend pay-out policy 
(Model) 
 
DP2 
(1) 
                             2SLS  
First Stage (Residuals)           Second Stage (Predicted) 
      (2)                                              (3) 
Lagged-Effects 
   (4)       
Fixed-Effects 
  (5)       
Corporate governance:     
  BS 0.002(.005)*** 0.152(.000)*** 0.265(.056)* 0.002(.915) 0.115(.252) 
  BI -0.017(.191) 2.590(.000)*** -8.709(.010)** -0.077(.773) -0.443(.048)** 
  CEO -0.006(.255) -0.690(.000)*** -7.031(.000)*** -0.042(.668) -0.097(.248) 
  BG -0.020(.111) -2.647(.000)*** -16.418(.001)*** -0.026(.039)** -0.059(.000)*** 
BM -0.003(.000)*** -0.069(.000)*** -0.226(.037)** -0.142(.582) -0.592(.005)*** 
AS 0.004(.005)*** -0.217(.004)*** 0.113(.076)* 0.010(.718) 0.077(.001)*** 
Controls:    
  FS 0.001(.393) 0.045(.000)*** 0.121(.090)* 0.080(.000)*** 0.522(.088)* 
  LEV 0.001(.060)* -0.261(.000)*** 0.016(.425) 0.033(.017)** 0.018(.153) 
  CFS 0.025(.000)*** 18.624(.000)*** 4.175(.010)** -0.100(.432) 0.371(.001)*** 
  ROA 0.000(.167) -0.006(.017)** 0.014(.000)*** -0.001(.677) 0.002(.117) 
Constant 0.021 0.305 11.376*** -1.069*** -4.392 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.071 2.050 2.050 1.947 2.078 
F- value 12.964*** 15.657*** 15.657*** 5.023*** 3.928*** 
Adj. R2 0.375 0.424 0.424 0.213   0.465 
No. of observations 200 200 200 150  200 
Notes: BS denotes board size; BI denotes board independence; CEO denotes CEO role duality; BM denotes frequency of board meetings; BG denotes board 
gender diversity; AS denotes audit committee size; FS denotes firm size; LEV denotes leverage; CFS denotes cash flow per share and ROA denotes return on 
assets. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. 
